To empirically examine the unbiased effect of management practice on firm productivity, this paper aims to suggest an instrumental variable approach, which requires less costly method. This study uses three firm-level instrumental variables such as the motivations for organizational reform, empowerment, and IT investment during the organizational reform. For empirical study, we use Korean manufacturing firm-level data that contains information on management score and financial statement. The results of the instrumental variable estimation show that better management practice leads to higher level of firm productivity statistically significantly, while the effect of management practices is statistically insignificant in the ordinary least square estimation.
Introduction
The astounding differences in productivity across firms have long been a topic of interest for economists. Specifically, management practices are examined to explain such differences. However, the field of economics profession has skepticism as to whether management matters. Bloom et al. (2013) argued that this skepticism stems from the difficulty of measuring management practices and of identifying its effects on productivity as a result of endogeneity. The former has been addressed by recent studies that emphasized the measurable aspects of management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007 , 2009 , 2011 Bloom et al., 2010 Bloom et al., , 2013 . Therefore, this paper suggests instrumental variable approach to deal with the latter.
There are some seminal studies to avoid endogeneity problem. To examine the unbiased effects of management practice on firm productivity, Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) used competition and primogeniture measures to instrument for management scores. 1 This is because the competitive and legal environments are independent of the other factors that affect management practices, at least in the short run. Alternatively, Bloom et al. (2013) suggests a randomized experiment as addressing endogeneity problem. They implemented a randomized experiment that provided managerial consulting services to textile plants in India, and therefore provided the first experimental evidence that management practices matters.
Since managerial consulting services were randomly assigned, their results would avoid the endogeneity problem. These studies suggested the positive effects of management practices on firm performance. However, primogeniture is not a firm-level instrumental variable, and random assignment is a very costly method that requires repetitive survey. This paper aims to suggest a firm-level and less costly instrumental variable approach to empirically examine the effects of management practices on firm-level productivity. The firm-level instrumental variables used in this paper are obtained from retrospective questions in survey of management practice, which is expected to reduce financial costs.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the methods used to measure management practices across firms, the empirical model employed, and the econometric issues associated with the assessment of the impacts of management practices on firm productivity. Section 3 presents the empirical results obtained using the firm-level instrumental variable estimation. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Estimation Strategy

Model Specification and Data
The following estimation equation is constructed to empirically examine the impact of management practices on firm-level total factor productivity (TFP). Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) . 3 According to Bloom et al. (2013) , recent work has focused on specific management practices, which can be measured, taught in business schools and recommended by consultant, in order to address the difficulty in quantifying management practices due to the complexity of management practices. This survey includes seven categories in organizational management and eight categories in human capital management. 5 Each category contained three sub-questions; if a response to the first question was negative, one point was assigned and the respondent moved to the next category. If a response to the first question was positive, two points were assigned, and the respondent proceeded to the second question. If the respondent gave a positive response to the second question, three points were assigned and the respondent moved on to the final question. Four points were assigned to a positive response to the final question, whereas three points were assigned to a negative response. Therefore, the maximum score is 60 (15 × 4).
For convenience, we convert the scale of scores from 1 ~ 60 to 1 ~ 100.
Measuring firm-level TFP (Yi), the dependent variable, has the issue of endogeneity problem of capital variable. To address this issue, this paper uses Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach that requires panel dataset and uses electricity costs as the instrumental variable for capital. Although the survey was conducted in just 2011, we can identify TFP through Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimation of production function from 2004 to 2011 4 According to Miyagawa et al. (2011) , the response rates in previous studies on management practices and firm performance were 54% in the work of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) , 59.2% in South Korea and 52.8% in Japan in Miyagawa et al. (2011) , and 10% in the study conducted by Ichikowshi (1999) . 5 Detailed survey questions are provided in appendix.
because this survey provides the annual series of firm-level financial statement thanks to linking with KIS. 6 We will extract the firm-level TFP in 2011 from the 2004-2011 series of TFP to run regression for Equation (1). Note that Equation (1) is the cross-section analysis because the survey for management practice was conducted in just 2011. Table 1 shows the results of estimating the firm-level production function by three different estimators, OLS (Ordinary Least Squares), Fixed-effects, and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . Consistent with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , OLS coefficient on labor exceeds the Levinsohn and Petrin estimates and the OLS estimate on capital is less than of Levinsohn and Petrin estimate. 7 Additional control variables are added: export intensity, R&D intensity and industry dummies. Export intensity is measured by the percentage of export sales to total sales. R&D intensity is computed by the percentage of previous R&D investment to total sales. Table 2 summarizes the statistics of the variables.
Econometric Issues
The endogeneity problem may occur in the estimation of Equation (1) because the decision of a firm to invest in the improvement of management practices may depend on its current productivity. If this problem is not addressed, the OLS estimates are biased. Equation (2) depicts the relationship between the true coefficient of  and the estimated coefficient,
where OLS  is the probability limits of the standard OLS and During 1997 During -2004 , as the economy faced the financial crisis of 1997, the government implemented policy changes with regard to corporate governance including the chaebol (Park and Kim, 2008) ." The crisis could lead to changes in corporate governance and business environment during this period. To avoid this period, we measure TFP of firms during 2004 -2011. 7 Because the magnitude of each firm's productivity shock varies over time and is not a constant fixed effect, the fixed-effects estimates differ quite substantially from the both OLS and LP estimates (Petrin, Poi and Levinsohn, 2004 The instrumental variables must be both relevant and exogenous. First, we validated relevance; that is, the instrumental variables should be related to management practice (
For this, we compare the distributions of management practice scores according to the value of instrument variable. It could be ideal to show management practice scores during 8 As with the results of the study conducted by Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) , high scores in management practice were attained when managers invested much time and effort in monitoring (the collection and processing of production information), target practice (the setting of coherent targets), the nurture of human resources through training, and promotion and hiring decisions. 9 The questions related to IVs are detailed in the appendix.
organizational reform. However, data availability allows for management practice scores in 2011. To alternatively check the relevance, we assume that the management practice in a firm is persistent across time unless a firm invests to improve management practice through organizational reform. Figure 1 Second, IVs should also be exogenous; that is, they should not affect TFP directly, except through management practices. Since organizational reform was conducted prior to the time t in the Equation (1), the time-precedence of organizational reform satisfied the exogeneity condition. However, if the variables are persistent across time, the time precedence is inadequate to justify the exogeneity. To support the exogeneity of instrumental variables, Table 3 presents the t-test results for TFPs prior to the organizational reform. Panel (A) of Table 3 demonstrates no significant difference in the average TFPs between firms who do not conduct organizational reform ("never") and firms who conduct organizational reform ("reformer"). As shown in Panel (B), the average TFP of reformers who conduct empowerment ("with empowerment") is not significantly different from that of "never" and reformers who do not conduct any empowerment ("without empowerment"). TFP of reformers who makes IT investment is not higher than that of "never" and reformers who do not make IT investment in Panel (C) of Table 3 . To assess the reliability of the instrumental variable estimates, diagnostic tests are also conducted in the next section. (1) show that management practices are positively but insignificantly associated with TFP. However, as discussed previously, the endogeneity problem may lead to biased OLS estimates. To obtain reliable results, this paper uses the instrumental variable approach.
Estimation Results
In columns (2)-(4), the two-stage least square (2SLS) procedure is used to implement the instrumental variable estimation. Column (2) includes motivations for organizational reform and empowerment during organizational reform as the instrumental variables. The third column has motivations for organizational reform and IT investment in organizational reform for the instrumental variable. The fourth column includes all three instrumental variables such as motivations, empowerment and IT investment. The coefficients of management practice are positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level from columns (2)-(4). One point increase in management practice score increases firm-level TFP by 4.6 percent in column (4). The relatively large 2SLS estimates demonstrate that OLS result underestimates the effects of management practices on TFP. 10 The direction of bias in OLS estimates suggests negative feedback from firm performance to managerial effort.
Several diagnostic tests were conducted to assess the reliability of the instrumental variable estimates. The first-stage F-statistics of the joint significance of the instruments were used to check the relevance of the instruments. The rule of thumb in Staiger and Stock (1997) was that the F-statistic should exceed ten. The first-stage F-statistics were above ten in this study; that is, the instrumental variables are relevant. Moreover, to check the exogeneity of the instrument, the Wu-Hausman test assesses whether instrumental variables are endogenous.
The insignificant test statistics in the columns (2)- (4) do not reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. Additionally, the Hansen statistics of overidentification test support that the set of instrumental variables are exogeneous.
Conclusion
This study has attempted to estimate the unbiased effect of management practices on firm-level productivity. For this, we suggest an inexpensive way of obtaining firm-level instrumental variables. The firm-level instrumental variables used in this study are identified based on retrospective questions regarding organizational reform in the management practice survey. The set of instrumental variables that we suggested has the advantage in that these are firm-level and less costly. These instrumental variables are relevant and exogenous. The results of the instrumental variable estimation show that better management practice leads to higher level of firm productivity statistically and significantly, while there is the positive but insignificant effect of management practices in the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation.
on TFP is larger than the OLS case. Note: Robust t-ratios are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. II. Management practice scoring in relation to instrumental variables.
The instrumental variables consist of the motivations for organizational reform, empowerment, and IT investment in the process of reform. The questions for each IV are detailed below.
Motivations for organizational reform
Why has your company undergone organizational reforms? (a) It was to do with poor performance that current management practice cannot deal with. (b) While it was nothing to do with poor performance, organizational reform was led by reforms of rival firms. (c) While it was nothing to do with poor performance, organizational reform was suggested by customers. (d) While it was nothing to do with poor performance, organizational reform was considered as preparations for future growth of our firm.
To distinguish the motivations for organizational reform, two dummy variables are used: motivation (poor performance) and motivation (regardless of performance). If a respondent selects 1(a), the variable for motivation (poor performance) is 1; otherwise, it is 0. If a respondent chooses either 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d), the variable for motivation (regardless of performance) is 1; otherwise, it is zero.
2. Empowerment (a) When a company undergoes organizational reform, sometimes the employees' decisionmaking authority is revised. In the case of your company, was decision-making authority given to those in a lower position as a result of the organizational reform? (b) Were posts simplified in conjunction with decision-making authority being given to those in a lower position? (c) As a result, was there a chance in the details of the job or the way of doing the job? 
